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How China’s Views on the Law of
Jus ad Bellum Will Shape Its Legal
Approach to Cyberwarfare
Julian Ku

Aegis Series Paper No. 1707

The US government has long sought to pressure China to publicly state its positions
on how and whether the international law governing the use of force between states
applies to cyberwarfare. China thus far has resisted this pressure, but its reticence
does not mean that China has no views on these legal questions or that its positions
will be based on purely political or strategic considerations. Rather, China’s legal
views on cyberwarfare will almost certainly be shaped by its general approach to
the international law governing the use of force. For this reason, investigating its
legal views on the use of force will illuminate China’s eventual legal approach to
cyberwarfare.
Traditionally, the Chinese government has adopted a strict positivist reading of the UN
Charter’s limitations on the use of force that brooks no exceptions for humanitarian
interventions and with a narrowly construed exception for self-defense. Although
China is hardly the only country that takes this positivist and restrictivist legal
approach, its strict reading of this law is at odds with legal positions taken by the US
government. Whereas the United States has sometimes endorsed a relatively capacious
definition of “self-defense” under international law and might do so again in the
cyber context, China’s restrictivist position would classify many “self-defensive” US
cyberwarfare actions as violations of the UN Charter.
Since China has not shown any willingness to abandon this legal approach to the
law of jus ad bellum codified in the charter, it is unlikely that China will embrace
the US legal approach to cyberwarfare. Rather, China will probably use its restrictive
reading of the UN Charter to garner political support among other countries
to criticize and deter offensive US cyberwarfare. This sharp divide between the
American and Chinese legal positions calls into question the efficacy of long-standing
US government efforts to convince China to accept and apply international law to
cyberwarfare.
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To flesh out the likely contours of China’s views on the legality of cyberwarfare, it is
useful to start with the Chinese government’s public statements on the applicability
of the law of jus ad bellum to cyberwarfare. We can then take a step back to review
China’s overall approach to the law of jus ad bellum by considering its approach
to doctrinal questions such as the definition of “use of force” and “armed attack”
and “self-defense” in the UN Charter in situations outside of the cyberwarfare
context. We can also look at recent Chinese legal academic scholarship on the law
of jus ad bellum and cyberwarfare. Having done all this, we can then assess how
China’s restrictivist views on the law of jus ad bellum in cyberwarfare could affect
US cyberstrategy and policy.

China, Cyberwarfare, and the Law of Jus ad Bellum
Conflict over cyber activity has become an increasingly serious area of bilateral
friction between China and the United States. Citing “the increasing prevalence and
severity of [foreign] malicious cyber-enabled activities,” then US president Barack
Obama announced in 2015 that he would authorize economic sanctions on any
foreign individuals or organizations found to be engaged in such activities.1 These
steps were made in the context of news reports detailing significant cyber breaches of
US government facilities by Chinese hackers and previous US indictments of Chinese
military personnel for hacking in the United States.2 A few months later, China and
the United States reached their first bilateral cyber-related agreement where both
countries pledged to “refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled
theft of intellectual property.”3 Perhaps as importantly, both countries agreed to
“pursue efforts to further identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in
cyberspace within the international community.” 4
But while the Chinese government has made efforts to “identify and promote appropriate
norms of state behavior in cyberspace,” it has generally shied away from openly
discussing its views on how the international law governing the use of force between
states (jus ad bellum) should apply to cyber conduct. For instance, when the Chinese
government released its first official national cyberstrategy document in March 2017,
it barely addressed questions of jus ad bellum.5 Its only reference merely called on
all states to avoid militarization of cyberspace and to adhere to the UN Charter’s
principles of “non-use or threat of force” and “peaceful settlement of disputes.”6 Similar
formulations also appeared in the government’s 2017 Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation
policy statement where China (along with other states) affirmed that principles in the UN
Charter such as the “non-use of force” should also apply to cyberspace.7
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However small these references are, US analysts were probably gratified that the
Chinese government has begun referring to the UN Charter in cyberspace at all.
It was only in 2013 that China officially agreed that the UN Charter and existing
international law apply to cyberspace.8 Prior to this time, Chinese government
statements had emphasized the difficulty of adapting international rules to cyberspace
and had focused on promoting an “international code of conduct” for cyberspace
instead. The Chinese government’s 2013 acknowledgment of the “applicability of
international law to cyberspace” was therefore warmly welcomed by the United States.9
In contrast, the US government has publicly and repeatedly declared that “cyber
activities may in certain circumstances constitute uses of force within the meaning of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law.”10 While the United
States has increased the transparency of its legal views on these issues, US analysts
have complained that China has refused to offer more specifics on how it would apply
the law of jus ad bellum to cyber activities. As a 2014 report to the China Economic and
Security Review Commission stated, “The Chinese government has not definitively
stated what types of [cyber] actions it considers to be an act of war which may reflect
nothing more than a desire to hold this information close to preserve strategic
flexibility in a crisis.”11 In the past, China has “taken the position in diplomatic
groupings that cyberattacks should not trigger the right to self-defense under the UN
Charter but called for new international legal regulations in regard to cyberspace.”12
Along with Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, China submitted a Draft International
Code of Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations secretary-general in
2011 and a revised version in 2015.13 The Draft Code of Conduct remains an important
statement of China’s worldview on the proper international regulation of cyber
activities. The initial draft of the Code asks members to pledge “not to use information
and communications technologies, including networks, to carry out hostile activities
or acts of aggression [or] pose threats to international peace and security.”14 The 2015
amended version borrows more directly from the UN Charter, but still offers little or
no guidance on how those prohibitions on the use of force would apply in the cyber
context.
As of 2017, China still advocates new international legislation for cyberspace. But it has
also acknowledged the applicability of existing rules such as the regulation of the use
of force in the UN Charter. On this latter point, the United States has sought, and will
likely continue to seek, further clarity from China and other cyber powers.15
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China and the Law of Jus ad Bellum
If and when China develops a detailed legal position on the law of jus ad bellum in
cyberspace, it will almost certainly take into account its existing views on this body
of law in other contexts. Outside of the cyberspace context, China’s government has a
substantial record of state practice and officially stated legal positions on the law of jus
ad bellum in general and in the context of particular cases. Such positions offer a rich
source of information needed to evaluate and predict China’s emerging legal approach
to cyberwarfare.

The Law of Jus ad Bellum
Jus ad bellum refers to the conditions under which nation-states may resort to war
or to the use of armed force in general. While historically jus ad bellum (Latin for
“right to war”) was understood to be comprised of philosophical principles for moral
conduct, the enactment of the UN Charter in 1945 distilled these principles into
binding international legal rules. Article 2(4) prohibits “the threat or the use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” This broad prohibition
is tempered by two explicit exceptions. First, the Security Council may use force if
it determines it is necessary to “maintain international peace and security.” Second,
Article 51 preserves the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”
Under the UN Charter regime, therefore, states seem to be restricted from using force
against other states unless such force is used under the authority of the UN Security
Council or it is used in “individual or collective self-defense” against an “armed
attack.” Legal justifications for a state’s use of force often depend on analysis of these
two exceptions or upon interpretive claims about the scope of the UN Charter’s
restrictions on the use of force. Broadly speaking, interpretations of these provisions
of the UN Charter can be divided into two camps: extensivists and restrictivists.
The “extensivist” camp favors interpretations that result in more possibilities for the
use of force than those two textual exceptions identified above. Doctrinally, such
interpretations usually favor “broad definition of self-defense, a rejection of a UN
monopoly to authorize military actions, and the admissibility of humanitarian or
pro-democratic interventions.”16 On the other side, we find interpretations that adopt
a positivist approach by focusing on the text of the UN Charter and sometimes on
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relevant General Assembly resolutions or applicable decisions of the International
Court of Justice. This positivist interpretive methodology leads to “restrictivist”
interpretations that limit self-defense to a narrow set of circumstances and recognize
few, if any, other exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force by states.17

China’s Views on the Law of Jus ad Bellum
The People’s Republic of China did not take its seat in the United Nations until 1971,
but it has become a devoted adherent to the United Nations and the principles of
the charter. In particular, the Chinese government’s public statements repeatedly
emphasize the importance of Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the threat or use of force. In
general, China has hewed consistently to the “positivist” methodology and restrictivist
interpretation. This section will first offer an overview of China’s general views on this
area of law. It will then examine three areas of doctrine that have particular salience
in the cyber context: the definition of “force” in Article 2, the necessity of UN Security
Council authorization for the use of force, and the right of self-defense.

Overview For decades, Chinese leaders have promoted the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence (FPPC) as a basic framework guiding China’s foreign relations. First
stated in 1953, the FPPC have been described in the preamble to China’s Constitution
as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression,
noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural
exchanges with other countries. The FPPC’s emphasis on sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and noninterference all echo language in the UN Charter and help to explain
the Chinese government’s ease and comfort in citing the UN Charter as the basis for
Chinese foreign policy when it finally took its seat there in 1971.
Indeed, the Chinese government’s 2005 position paper on United Nations reform
lauded that body’s “indispensable role in international affairs” and the “best venue
to practice multilateralism.”18 The paper supported some minor reforms, but its main
message was that the United Nations’ role in world affairs should remain central and
that none of its institutions required radical reform. This includes the UN Charter’s
framework for regulating the use of force by states. Its statement on those particular
provisions is a useful summary of China’s overall views on this subject.
The position paper emphasizes that “China consistently stands for settlement of
international disputes by peaceful means and opposes the threat or use of force in
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international relations.”19 It then goes on to reject suggestions that changes to the
charter to enlarge exceptions to Article 2’s prohibition on the use of force are needed.
We are of the view that Article 51 of the Charter should neither be amended nor
reinterpreted. The Charter lays down explicit provisions on the use of force, i.e., use of
force shall not be resorted to without the authorization of the Security Council with the
exception of self-defense under armed attack.20

The centrality of Security Council control over the use of force (except for selfdefense) is a common theme of China’s approach to the UN Charter. As the position
paper states flatly, “The Security Council is the only body that can decide the use
of force.”21 It specifically rejects any role for regional organizations in making this
decision. Reliance on the Security Council’s case-by-case judgment is necessary
“given the varying causes and nature of crises . . .”22 Thus, the position paper
concludes “it is both unrealistic and hugely controversial to formulate a ‘one- fits-all’
rule or criterion on the use of force.”23
China’s stated views on the proper role of the Security Council do not make it an
outlier, but it does place China squarely in the “positivist/restrictivist” approach to the
law of jus ad bellum. With the exception of self-defense, China believes any decision
about the use of force by states should be left solely to the discretion of the Security
Council’s judgment on a case-by-case basis.
There is only one slight variation to this strict positivist/restrictivist approach. Leading
Chinese textbooks on international law continue to identify one other exception to the
Security Council’s monopoly on force: armed resistance by peoples rightfully exercising
their rights of self-determination.24 These texts all reference a 1970 General Assembly
Declaration on Principles of International Law25 and the statements by various countries
(historically associated with the communist bloc) that the use of force is permissible in
these contexts.26 But while this nonbinding General Assembly declaration highlights
the duty of states to refrain from “forcible action” that deprives “peoples” of selfdetermination, it does not explicitly endorse the right of those “peoples” to use force.
While this position seems to be an artifact of China’s historical association with
decolonization movements and the communist bloc, Chinese texts continue to cite this
as a possible exemption to the UN Charter. As one text explains, “Under international
law, aggressive wars and colonial wars are unjust wars, wars to resist aggression and
colonization are just wars . . . Unjust wars are a violation of international law.”27
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With this one caveat, however, China’s general approach to the UN Charter’s
provisions can be described as a straightforward example of positivism and
restrictivism. In this view, the use of force by states is prohibited absent Security
Council authorization with the sole exception of self-defense. No serious consideration
is given to extensivist approaches, for instance, that allow for humanitarian
interventions without Security Council approval such as that adopted by NATO in the
1999 Kosovo conflict.

The Definition of “Use of Force” The clarity and simplicity of this approach does not
mean the Chinese government and Chinese scholars can avoid all of the difficult
interpretive issues raised by the text of the charter’s use-of-force provisions. For
instance, states have sometimes struggled to define the term “use of force” in Article 2.
Various interpretive disputes have arisen.
First, Article 2’s prohibition on the use of force could be interpreted to encompass
both military and nonmilitary uses of coercion.28 Thus, in this reading, coercive
economic or political pressure could fall under Article 2’s prohibition on the use of
force.29 Though often critical of coercive economic sanctions, the Chinese government
has not embraced this more expansive definition of the use of force. Instead, China
has consistently supported General Assembly resolutions defining unilateral coercive
economic sanctions as an impermissible interference in the domestic affairs of
another state.30 This view accords better with the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which specifically condemned
such economic actions as interventionist while not defining it as a use of force.31
This document is often cited in Chinese international law texts as an authoritative
interpretation of the UN Charter.
Authoritative Chinese government statements on the exact scope of the use of force
are rare, but recent Chinese scholarship has suggested that China’s views are likely to
be conventional and uncontroversial. Eschewing the broad definition of “force” that
would include economic sanctions, Chinese scholars commenting on the meaning of
“force” have made several interpretive points. First, such scholarship has emphasized
that Article 2’s usage of the phrase “force” as opposed to war or aggression should not be
construed to allow “war” or “aggression.”32 Rather, the proper reading of Article 2 is that
the “force” language is intended to be broader than the League of Nations Covenant’s
reference to war and that it also prohibits acts of war or aggression.33 Indeed, some
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scholars have gone out of their way to emphasize that the language of the charter is
intended to “prohibit actions by those states engaging in military invasions who don’t
declare war or who engage in excuses that their actions are not war, and who try to
avoid international responsibility or sanctions.”34
Second, Chinese scholars have maintained that the scope of Article 2’s prohibition
extends beyond merely force against “territorial integrity and political independence.”
Rather, Article 2’s language prohibiting force for any reason inconsistent with the UN
Charter should be conceptualized as a broad protection of a state’s sovereignty beyond
territory and independence.35 This approach follows the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) 1986 decision in the Nicaragua case.
Third, Chinese scholars have noted disagreements among scholars on the definition of
“threat” under Article 2. While a threat must be coercive in nature to trigger Article 2,
scholars suggest a threat requires a clear statement of intent to use force.36 This accords,
for instance, with the Chinese government’s recent criticism of the Philippines for
“threatening to use force” by sending its navy to occupy the disputed Scarborough
Shoal, thus triggering China’s necessary response.37 Given China’s status as a nuclear
power, it is not surprising that Chinese scholars have endorsed the view, promulgated
by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, that mere possession of nuclear
weapons is not enough to constitute a threat within the meaning of Article 2.38 The
same analysis would apply to the legality of large-scale military exercises, an activity
in which China’s growing military is increasingly engaged.
Fourth, as mentioned, Chinese scholars have resisted efforts to apply Article 2’s
prohibition on the use of force to domestic civil wars. While China has long supported
the right of groups to resist colonization and to exercise self-determination, China’s
long-standing goal of reunifying with Taiwan probably shapes its views on this
question. In 2005, for instance, China enacted an “anti-secession” law that directs the
Chinese government to “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures
to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”39 in event of a Taiwanese
effort to “secede” from China. If Article 2 applied to large-scale civil wars as some
Western scholars have argued,40 then military action to reunify Taiwan with China
would be legally suspect. The legal argument here is that Article 2 applies only to
the use of force by states against other states. There is no reason in this view to apply
such a prohibition to a state’s domestic affairs since that would also threaten a state’s
sovereignty.
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In sum, the Chinese government has not specified its detailed interpretation of
“force” or “threat” in the context of Article 2. This is hardly a criticism, as few other
countries have done so either. Based on a review of Chinese scholarship, however,
China’s views on the definition of force seem broadly compatible with American and
Western understandings. “Force” does not include economic or political coercion and
the “threat” of force is not triggered merely by possessing dangerous and threatening
military weapons like nuclear missiles.

The Necessity of Security Council Authorization As discussed above, China has voiced
its adherence to a restrictivist Security Council monopoly on the use of force with a
sole exception for self-defense. This approach thus would reject the legal argument for
allowing states to use force in “humanitarian interventions,” even without Security
Council authorization. The legal case for humanitarian intervention typically relies
on a reading of Article 2(4) to prohibit “use of force” only against a state’s territorial
integrity or political independence. Because humanitarian intervention does not
threaten a state’s territorial integrity or political independence, and taking into account
its long history in state practice,41 some scholars and states have argued for its legality
under the charter.42 This debate among Western scholars has left the legality of such
interventions unsettled.43 But the legal case for humanitarian intervention has found no
support in Chinese scholarship. As a leading Chinese scholar on the issue writes,
There was no express prohibition against humanitarian intervention in modern
international law. However, after 1945 when the Charter of United Nations
was formulated, the so-called “humanitarian intervention” has actually been
prohibited by international law, and the corresponding theory has been denied and
discarded by international law because the Charter expressly stipulates the principle
of non-interference of internal affairs and the principle of prohibition of use of
military force.44

This view does not mean that China opposes all interventions for humanitarian
reasons. In its role as a permanent member of the Security Council, China has not
opposed—and has even supported—several post-Cold War interventions that were
made on humanitarian grounds. Most notably, China supported the Security Council’s
approval of a mission to Somalia in 199245 and abstained from votes on several other
UN humanitarian-motivated interventions in places such as Haiti and Bosnia.46 But it
has consistently insisted that the Security Council, and not individual states, determine
whether force should be used for a humanitarian intervention.
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Consistent with this view, the Chinese government was a strong and consistent critic
of NATO’s 1999 military intervention in the Serbia-Kosovo conflict. Even before
China’s Belgrade embassy was bombed by NATO forces, Chinese officials indicated
their opposition to any military intervention absent Security Council authorization
(and agreed with Russia that no such authorization should be given). After NATO
launched an attack on Serbia to avert what NATO believed would be a humanitarian
crisis in Kosovo, China denounced the NATO intervention. The action, China’s UN
ambassador declared, “violated the purposes, principles and relevant provisions of the
United Nations Charter, as well as international law and widely acknowledged norms
governing relations between States.” 47 While China’s opposition was no doubt strategic
and political, its opposition to the idea of humanitarian intervention without Security
Council approval also fit with its restrictivist legal view of Article 2.
This restrictivist legal view also helps to explain China’s approach to the 2005 effort
in the United Nations to adopt a principle of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) that
would respond to Rwanda or Kosovo types of humanitarian crises. China did not back
down from its opposition to humanitarian intervention and only reluctantly endorsed
the idea that the humanitarian atrocities within a state could trigger any sort of duty
or responsibility among other states. Thus, while the Chinese government accepted
the principle of R2P, its acceptance was made with reluctance as a way to respond
to the “abuse” of the concept of humanitarian intervention by Western powers.48
Hence, the Chinese acceptance of R2P required several important preconditions.
First, R2P can be triggered only by the four most serious international crimes:
“genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.” No
foreign intervention, military or otherwise, is justified absent these extraordinary
circumstances. Indeed, any action is first and foremost the responsibility of the host
state. But even in these circumstances, the use of force still requires authorization from
the Security Council or consent from the host state.
These preconditions made Chinese acceptance of R2P much easier and a recent
study has found wide support for the concept among Chinese officials and scholars.
Some scholars have become more cautious about R2P in the aftermath of the 2011
Libya intervention because it was widely seen within China as a mistake to vote to
allow NATO intervention.49 But other scholars have pointed out that China’s growing
overseas interests, especially the growing number of Chinese nationals abroad, might
necessitate Chinese protection overseas.50
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The acceptance of R2P thus does not suggest any weakening of China’s traditional
insistence on a Security Council monopoly on the use of force. To the contrary, there
is reason to think China’s government saw the UN R2P process as an opportunity
to limit further Western claims about a right to humanitarian intervention. By
demanding Security Council control over any R2P-inspired use of force, China
reaffirmed its commitment to its restrictivist reading of Article 2 giving the Security
Council a monopoly on the use of force by states except in self-defense.

Self-defense The final and most legally contentious doctrinal area of modern jus ad
bellum law turns on the meaning of Article 51’s “inherent right” of self-defense. As
the only textual exception to Article 2’s prohibition on the use of force, the scope and
meaning of this right is raised by almost all states who have sought to legally justify
their military actions after 1945.
In parallel with views on the scope of Article 2’s prohibition on the use of force, views
on the meaning of Article 51’s right to self-defense fall into two categories: restrictivist
interpretations of the right to collective and individual self-defense versus extensivist
interpretations that allow force against threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, and cyberattacks.51
Like its legal approach to Article 2, the Chinese government’s approach to Article 51
tends to fall on the restrictivist side. Indeed, Chinese scholars typically claim all of
China’s military actions since 1945 have been lawful exercises of self-defense. But
while China has expressed skepticism of US claims of a broad right of “preemptive”
self-defense and has advocated a narrow definition of “armed attack” that would
justify self-defense, the Chinese government has been willing to recognize a right of
states to invoke the right of self-defense against transnational terrorist organizations.

China’s Practice The importance of invoking self-defense as a right and justification
for military action has a long pedigree in modern China. Before the establishment of
the People’s Republic of China, then Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Tse-tung
was quoted as setting forth self-defense as a basic principle for the CCP: “If you don’t
attack me, I won’t attack you. If you attack me, I will definitely attack you.”52 Mao
went on to instruct party members to strictly abide by the principle of self-defense.
Although Mao was referring to his political rival and civil war enemy, the Nationalist
Party, the quotation has been adopted by the People’s Liberation Army as a slogan and
guiding principle more generally.
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Thus, the Chinese government has generally characterized all four of its major
military clashes with foreign states since 1945 as exercises of self-defense. In its first
post-1945 action, the Chinese government sent a People’s Volunteer Force to support
North Korea during the Korean War. Although China was not a member of the United
Nations at the time due to US support at that time for its rival government on Taiwan,
it was careful to characterize its intervention as either unofficial or an exercise of selfdefense due to US threats against Chinese territory.53 While there are reasons to doubt
the authenticity of the self-defense rationale since US forces never directly attacked
Chinese territory,54 the existence of a large United States-led military force near the
Chinese border with North Korea did pose a serious challenge to the then new People’s
Republic of China.
China more persuasively invoked the right of self-defense in response to a series
of armed clashes with India over their disputed border. Many historians blame the
Indian government for initiating the hostilities, although it was China who launched
the first large-scale offensive attack.55 Still, after each offensive, China’s good-faith
claim of self-defense was bolstered by its willingness to unilaterally withdraw from
the disputed border even after it had successfully defeated Indian army units. Unlike
the Korean War example where US forces threatened but never attacked Chinese forces
or entered into Chinese territory, China’s use of force in the Indian conflict generally
occurred after it had already suffered an armed attack on territory over which it claimed
sovereignty.
China also cited self-defense to justify its short 1969 border conflict with the Soviet
Union. Here, the Chinese case is murkier because Chinese forces initiated hostilities
by attacking Soviet border guards on the disputed Damanskii (Zhenbao) Island located
in the Ussuri River.56 The Soviets responded by bombarding Chinese troops on the
Chinese side of the river and sending tanks onto the islands to attack Chinese troops.
Border clashes also took place along other parts of the China-USSR border, leading to
fears of an all-out war. Though China initiated the armed conflict, Chinese scholars
have typically characterized the Zhenbao conflict as an example of Soviet aggression
necessitating Chinese self-defense.
Chinese scholars have also invoked self-defense to justify China’s 1978 invasion
of Vietnam. This factual case is even more difficult to make here because Chinese
leaders publicly admitted that the goal of the war was to “teach Vietnam a lesson” and
support China’s ally in Cambodia.57 Nevertheless, Chinese scholars have also pointed
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to Vietnamese raids across the Chinese border as “self-defense” justification for the
invasion.
Whether or not they are supported by the facts, Chinese scholars have often tried to
justify China’s own military actions by invoking the “inherent right” of self-defense in
Article 51. As one Chinese textbook explains,
China has consistently supported the principle of self-defense, and has never used force
illegally. China’s constant position is to use peaceful means of international dispute
settlement. But it has never submitted to any foreign country’s armed aggression. After
the establishment of New China, it has encountered four situations [Korea, India, USSR,
and Vietnam] where it has been compelled to use force, and it has used its rights under the
rules of the self-defense in the UN Charter each time.

Outside of its own military actions, the Chinese government has also publicly
committed itself to a narrower definition of self-defense than many of its nucleararmed peers. Before India joined the nuclear club in the 1990s, China was the sole
declared nuclear power that had committed itself to a “no-first-use” nuclear weapons
policy. This means that China has pledged it will never use nuclear weapons in
response to a nonnuclear attack. It has repeatedly reaffirmed this policy in “white
papers” and it has presented its fellow nuclear powers with a draft treaty to the same
effect. While such restraint in the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nonnuclear
armed attack is not legally required by Article 51, China’s long-standing public
commitment to no-first-use is a tangible sign of its willingness to limit its ability to use
certain types of armed force in its self-defense. Indeed, China has shown a willingness to
limit its use of other new military technology beyond what might be required by the
law of self-defense. For instance, China is believed to have the capability to use drones
for lethal strikes against hostile targets, but it appears to have restrained itself from
using this power.58 Similarly, China has repeatedly warned against the militarization
of outer space and has warned in particular against the abuse of self-defense in this
context.59
It is too simple, however, to characterize China as either consistently hostile or
consistently supportive of a robust right of self-defense. In many cases, China is
unwilling to accept other states’ (especially the United States’) claims of self-defense.
China was one of the few countries to publicly question the propriety of the 1993
US missile strike on Baghdad responding to Iraqi assassination plans against former
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US president George H. W. Bush. Invoking the UN Charter, China stated its opposition
“to any action that can contravene the Charter of the United Nations and norms of
international relations.”60 China was also clear in its opposition to US claims to a right
of “preemptive” self-defense in Iraq or in other regions of the world.
Yet China did not condemn or oppose US military actions in response to the al-Qaeda
terrorist attacks on 9/11. In fact, China supported US invocations of its right to selfdefense against terrorist attacks under Article 51. In addition to voting in support of
UN Security Council resolutions supporting US actions, China has refrained from
criticizing the legality of American post-9/11 action in Afghanistan.61 China’s silence
on the US response to 9/11 versus its robust criticism of the US war on Iraq shows that
it (like many countries) saw important policy and legal distinctions between the two
US military actions.

Chinese Scholarship Chinese scholarship on the law of self-defense supports this
general approach. One of China’s leading scholars on self-defense, Professor Xu
Mincai, has set forth a conventional legal framework for analyzing the right of selfdefense.62 Recognizing the pre-charter origins of the right of self-defense, Xu accepts
that the contours of the right are drawn from customary international law rather than
purely from the text of the charter. He also recognizes that the right of self-defense
is not limited to attacks by other states, but can also occur in response to attacks by
transnational non-state actors like al-Qaeda. Other Chinese scholars have supported
this view and have also offered a legal defense of the US attack on Afghanistan on 
self-defense grounds.63
On the other hand, Xu and other Chinese scholars have argued for strict preconditions
before the right of self-defense can be exercised. For instance, following the ICJ’s
decision in Nicaragua, Xu argues that any “armed attack” justifying self-defense must
rise to a certain level of “gravity and seriousness.”64 This suggests that an armed
attack which causes only minor damage to property or life would not justify an act
of self-defense.
Like most scholars in the restrictivist school, Chinese scholars are uniformly skeptical
of any right to self-defense before an actual armed attack has occurred. While they
follow the “imminence” requirement stated in the famous Caroline case, neither are
they willing to accept any loose or broad definition of this requirement. For this
reason, Xu argues that merely planning an armed attack is not itself an armed attack
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triggering the right of self-defense.65 Chinese scholars have uniformly rejected the
United States’ statement of “preemptive” self-defense in its National Security Strategy
and in relation to the Iraq War of 2003.66
A scholar from one of China’s military universities has distilled China’s approach to
self-defense to six elements:
• Respect a “time requirement” and reject “preemptive” self-defense.
• Respect a “targeting” requirement and do not allow states to use self-defense against
one state on third-party states.
• Respect every state’s own determination of self-defense and do not allow other states to
determine.
• Follow the spirit of the definition of self-defense in responding to new types of
aggression. New military technology does not change the definition of “use of force.”
China has authority to act in self-defense to these new types of attacks.
• Firmly support the proportionality principle and prevent excessive uses of selfdefense.
• Support transparency and notice and seek support of the international community for
any action in self-defense.67
With the addition of its willingness to recognize self-defense actions against non-state
actors, the Chinese government’s approach to self-defense can be fairly summarized
by these six principles. To be sure, there remains uncertainty about how China might
apply these principles in practice. For instance, a PLA scholar also suggested China
has the right to act in self-defense against nonconventional attacks such as public
relations, psychological, legal, and cyberwarfare.68 Yet it is unclear whether the author
thinks the same restrictivist approach China applies in other contexts should apply to
these new types of attacks.

Conclusion
China’s views and practice on the law of jus ad bellum can be safely characterized as
falling on the positivist and restrictivist side of approaches to this area of law. The next
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section explores how this approach might shape its thinking about this law applied to
cyberwarfare.

Combining Chinese Views on Jus ad Bellum and Cyberspace
China’s general views on the law of jus ad bellum will shape China’s approach to the
legal implications of cyberwarfare. Because China will likely use law to justify its
cyberwarfare activities or criticize others’ cyber actions, elucidating China’s likely
views is even more important. To date, however, the Chinese government has been
circumspect in making public statements on cyber policy, much less the application of
international law to cyber policy. This section will review emerging Chinese academic
legal scholarship discussing cyberwarfare and the law of jus ad bellum in hopes of
gleaning insights into the Chinese government’s likely positions on these issues.

Chinese Reactions to the Tallinn Manual
The Tallinn Manual is an ambitious effort by legal experts to study and propose ways
that international law would apply to transnational cyber activity and cyberwarfare.
Convened by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization cyber institute, the experts
published the “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare”
in 2013. Although many of the experts, including chief editor Michael Schmitt, have
affiliations with the United States or other NATO country armed forces, the Tallinn
Manual represents the independent views of the expert authors rather than the views
of their employers or home governments. A second publication by the same group,
dubbed “Tallinn 2.0,” examined how international law treats cyber operations that do
not rise to the level of “armed attack” under the law of jus ad bellum.
Although no Chinese experts served as coauthors of the first Tallinn Manual and only
began participating during the second Tallinn Manual process, Chinese academics
have paid keen attention to the work product of the Tallinn Manual process. Their
reactions and critiques help to illuminate likely Chinese government positions on the
legal issues addressed by the first Tallinn Manual.

Skepticism about Motives and Process
Initial reactions to the Tallinn Manual in Chinese media were muted. Chinese
media commentators had already expressed suspicion that activities like the Tallinn
Manual were simply tools for US manipulation of the international legal process. As
one Chinese media commentator put it, the United States is attempting to “spur the
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international community into drawing up rules for cyberwarfare in order to put a
cloak of legality on its ‘preemptive strike’ strategy in cyberwarfare.”69 Other semiauthoritative media reactions, including one published by commentator Li Ying in the
People’s Liberation Army Daily, characterized the Tallinn Manual as simply an effort to
find a legal basis to justify NATO’s control over cyberspace.70
The PLA Daily critique noted that while the Tallinn Manual insisted that cyberspace
must be governed by law, especially international law, the manual also approved as
legal many cyber activities. Such legal activities included creating “puppet” computer
systems to give a false impression of military strength, sending false or misleading
orders to enemy forces, surveillance, and other activities. The commentary wryly noted
that these legalized activities “left the United States plenty of legal space to conduct
its most commonly used methods of cyberattacks.” Ultimately, the commentary
concluded that the Tallinn Manual represents another effort by the United States to
protect its interests and maintain its dominance in the information warfare age.71
This general attitude can also be seen in an essay published by foreign affairs
commentator Wu Chu in the Global Times responding to the release of Tallinn 2.0
(TM2) in 2017. While noting TM2 had become a “must read,” it warned that “the
international law of cyberspace involves the interests and concerns of the entire
international society, and it is inappropriate for it to be subject to the manipulation of
ideas peddled by a small circle of Western think tanks.”72 It also criticized the West’s
enthusiasm for the Tallinn Manual process and its refusal to submit these issues to
the United Nations for negotiation as China and most developing nations wanted. It
noted the irony of the West, which previously enjoyed bragging about its “carrying of
the flag” for international law, becoming the main obstacle to international legislation
in this area. It concluded by calling for the governance of cyberspace to be developed
with equal participation of all states through the administration of the United Nations.
The same commentator published a short essay in February 2017 striking similar notes
about Tallinn 2.0 on the official WeChat account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
Department of Treaty and Law. Wu again highlighted the prominence of Western
scholars with governmental backgrounds in the Tallinn 2.0 drafting. It also suggested
that the intent of Western states to use the Tallinn manuals to create legal norms
through “shadow” lawmaking was becoming even clearer with the release of Tallinn
2.0. Yet, in the view of the author, the norms offered in both manuals exceeded
existing understandings of international law.73
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Independent Chinese scholars have also offered similar critiques of the motives and
goals of the Tallinn Manual’s drafters. Professor Zhu Lixin of Xi’an Jiaotong University’s
Information Security Center has become a frequent observer of the Tallinn Manual’s
work product. But in a 2015 paper, she also complained that the Tallinn Manual is not
limited to just “international law” and that it has too much political intention and
military theory running through its contents. “In reality,” she warns, “[Tallinn] is a
legal tool in the US government’s execution of its cyberspace strategy.”74

Substantive Critiques Some Chinese scholarship has also offered substantive
critiques of the first Tallinn Manual. While conceding that international law applies
to cyberspace, Chinese scholar Chen Qi noted that even the commentary within each
provision of the Tallinn Manual reveals disagreement among the manual’s authorexperts. Disagreement, Chen noted, seems to exist on such thorny questions as a
cyberattack’s subject, form, and consequences in different armed attack circumstances.75
These disagreements and uncertainties, Chen argued, show that the norms of
cyberwarfare identified in the Tallinn Manual are not drawn from formal sources
of international law. In reality, Chen charged, the Tallinn Manual is creating
“new cyber law norms.”76 For instance, six of the eleven factors recommended by
the manual for use in determining whether a cyber action is a use of force were
developed by Tallinn Manual chief author Michael Schmitt in his earlier writings.
The origin of these factors in the writing of a US Navy-affiliated academic suggests,
in Chen’s view, that they have achieved little general recognition and acceptance in
international law.77
Chen specifically criticized the Tallinn Manual’s Rule 13 for expanding a state’s right
of self-defense under international law by suggesting that serious damage to critical
cyber network facilities alone could be sufficient to justify an act of self-defense in
some circumstances. Similarly, Chen critiqued the manual’s expansion of the right
of self-defense to a third state that was not the target of a cyberattack, but which had
suffered the consequences of the cyberattack on another state.78 Such an approach,
Chen warned, could lead to dangerous effects such as an incident in 2013 when South
Korea attributed a cyberattack to North Korea and China but ended up discovering the
attack had originated from within South Korea itself.79
Chen leveled further critiques on the Tallinn Manual’s treatment of the right of a
state to invoke self-defense against individuals or non-state organizations, a concept
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the author noted is almost certainly drawn from US doctrines developed in the war
on terrorism. Similarly, the manual suggests a preemptive strike against an imminent
cyberattack could be legal. Chen wondered how a state facing such an attack could
establish the requisite level of damage or harm caused by an imminent (as opposed to
actual) cyberattack.
Overall, Chen is concerned that the expansive notion of self-defense in the Tallinn
Manual could lead to the abuse of this right by the United States and its allies. In
expressing this concern, Chen echoed traditional Chinese concerns about US “abuse”
of this right with respect to the use of new technologies such as in outer space and
about the US concept of preemption as applied to cases like the Iraq War.
Other Chinese scholars have focused on the technical difficulties in attributing
cyberattacks to states. Professor Huang Zhixiong, a scholar at Wuhan University who
participated in the second Tallinn Manual process, has expressed detailed concerns
about the challenges of attribution. In a 2014 article, he identified two distinct
characteristics of cyberattacks: 1) they are usually conducted by individual or small
groups of hackers whose relationship with particular states is hard to confirm; and,
2) the secretive nature of hacking attacks makes attributing the sources of such attacks
extremely difficult.80 He then argued that some Western scholars had sought to
overcome these difficulties by loosening or even abolishing attribution standards for
state responsibility in cyberattacks by developing new concepts for cyber attribution
such as “imputed responsibility.”
Huang argued that this idea, analogized from the idea of a state’s duty to prevent
terrorist attacks from its territory, remains hotly disputed as a matter of international
law and has not achieved any level of consensus. It would enlarge the scope of state
responsibility for cyberattacks and actually create a higher likelihood of state-to-state
conflict. Moreover, this rule might also end up drawing third-party states who
unknowingly host an attack into a conflict.
This and other proposed innovations in the law by scholars or by certain states like
the United States, Huang argued, will only contribute to confusion and disagreement
among states about the proper rules for determining state responsibility. Instead,
Huang recommended a return to the framework for state responsibility set out by the
UN International Law Commission in 2001 as a common basis for resolving issues of
state attribution for cyber activities.
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Conclusion and Assessment
This paper has reviewed China’s general approach to the law of jus ad bellum in hopes
of gleaning insights into its application of that law to cyberwarfare. China’s treatment
of this area of law has been consistent and largely coherent for much of its recent
history. For the Chinese government, the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force
should be interpreted using standard positivist tools of text, drafting history, and
judicial interpretation. These positivist tools have led China to consistently endorse
a “restrictivist” understanding of Article 2 that prohibits any use of military force by
one state against another absent authorization from the UN Security Council or a
situation involving self-defense. Interpretive claims to preexisting rights to use force
for “humanitarian intervention” have found no support from the government or from
academics.
To be sure, China’s government has on occasion departed from a purely restrictivist
position. It has long endorsed a right of “peoples” (as opposed to recognized states)
to use military force in self-defense and it has accepted that the right of self-defense
can be invoked to use force against non-state terrorist organizations. Its own claims
of self-defense in wars against Vietnam, India, and the Soviet Union are factually
weak. But as a doctrinal matter, China’s legal positions on the law of jus ad bellum
can safely be classified as restrictivist on almost all questions and in every area of its
own practice.
Although China’s government has expressed strong support for the “inherent” right of
self-defense contained in Article 51 and has typically tried to frame its own military
actions in this rubric, China has long been concerned that states might abuse this
right. This concern will likely animate Chinese critiques of emerging US positions on
the application of this right in the context of cyberwarfare. Such critiques, as I have
discussed, have already been expressed in Chinese academic scholarship on these
issues.
Seen in this light, the possibility for a consensus between the United States and China
on how the law of jus ad bellum applies to cyberwarfare seems remote. This should not
be surprising since the United States and China are usually divided on applications
of the law of jus ad bellum. Such divisions are not, as this paper tries to show, merely
due to political or strategic considerations. Rather, the Chinese government’s prior
legal positions on the law of jus ad bellum will also influence its future views on
cyberwarfare.
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These differences also call into question the long-standing US goal of winning China’s
commitment to applying international law to cyberspace. If, as this paper observes, the
United States and China maintain different understandings of self-defense and actions
outside of the scope of the UN Charter, then China’s willingness to obey the law of jus
ad bellum to cyberspace may not advance American policy significantly. Moreover, the
fact that the United States has a less restrictivist conception of the law of jus ad bellum
than China may explain China’s historic reluctance to wholeheartedly embrace the
jus-ad-bellum-in-cyberspace framework. China may not see much benefit in signing
onto a regime which it believes strictly limits its rights of self-defense and third-party
intervention, but where its main competitor, the United States, is not so limited. For
these reasons, America is unlikely to win China’s public adherence to the law of jus
ad bellum in cyberspace. But even if it did, it is uncertain that such adherence would
benefit the United States in any meaningful way.
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Synopsis

About the Author

This paper conducts such an investigation and concludes
that the Chinese government has adopted a strict positivist
reading of the UN Charter’s limitations on the use of force
that brooks no exceptions for humanitarian interventions and
with a narrowly construed exception for self defense. Since
China has not shown any willingness to abandon this legal
approach to the law of jus ad bellum codified in the Charter,
it is unlikely that China will embrace the US legal approach
to cyberwarfare. Rather, China will probably use its restrictive
reading of the UN Charter to garner political support among
other countries to criticize and deter offensive US cyberwarfare. This sharp divide between the United States and
Chinese legal positions calls into question the efficacy of
long-standing US government efforts to convince China to
accept and apply international law to cyberwarfare.
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